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Was there a military revolution from 1460 to 1740
The question addressed by this essay remains one which still divides historians. One school of thought is that the changes were so monumental over the period 1460 to 1740 that they constitute a revolution. Such a school of thought is headed by the likes of Howard and Roberts. Their theory is rejected by historians such as Jeremy Black who believe that a revolution might have occurred but that it was in the period 1660 to 1740. However, Black also provides evidence that undermines his own belief that major changes occurred even in his own chosen time span. For the purposes of this essay, “revolution” has been defined as a major and fundamental change that greatly altered society though not necessarily for the better. Roberts and Howard believe that the changes in weaponry, tactics and soldiering were of such fundamental importance that society itself was changed to accommodate these changes. In 1460 the standard soldier was armed at his own expense with either a pike sword or whatever else could be gathered in the time that ‘soldiers’ had to prepare themselves before leaving on a campaign. Most soldiers at this time were taken from the land to fight for their master but they were amateurs, unskilled in what historians today would recognise as standard military procedures and as such their commanding officers were severely handicapped with regards to the tactics they could employ as the responses they would get from their ‘soldiers’ were limited in the extreme. By our accepted standards armies were small and battlefield tactics invariably relied on rushing your opponent in an unscientific manner. Casualties could be high if not from death on the actual battlefield from the wounds received in battle. Those states that could afford to do so, employed mercenaries. These were men who were usually far more skilled in the art of fighting but their ability cost. Their price put them out of the reach of most states and those states that could afford them usually were the ones that tended to dominate European politics. However, mercenaries were not loyal and no long term campaign could be constructed around the use of them as they were equally as likely to fight for your enemy as for you. Developments from 1460 to 1740 eventually lead to the virtual extinction of the mercenary. The famed pikemen of Switzerland were neutralised by the development of the matchlock musket and the early though crude artillery pieces. These new weapons, according to Roberts and Howard, were to transform Europe as those states that could afford them could ‘bully’ other states into compliance or physically dominate them, That meant that new weapons and their importance could only be fruitfully used by those states that had wealth. Though artillery pieces were cumbersome, they could be effective in destroying fortifications and severely undermining the ranks of pikemen facing them. By 1600, Roberts asserts that Europe was dividing into two camps - those who could afford a sustained campaign and those who could not but attached themselves as client states to the wealthy ones. Tactics also underwent a fundamental change in the era stated in the title. The use of modem weaponry meant new tactics were needed to fully utilise them. The new weapons - especially the flintlock musket that replaced the matchlock - also needed a new type of soldier; one who knew how to use these weapons and as each new weapon needed training to master it, soldiers moved from the civilian/soldier type when warfare demanded them, to the professional soldier who was trained to use the new weapons , thus justifying their expense, and who was totally loyal to his master (the state’s leader) and who could be used by the state to impose his master’s authority over his people. This advance in state control of the civil population is considered by Howard to be very important and therefore revolutionary as for the first time leaders such as the Great Elector and Louis XIV could claim to be autocratic with all but total power over their population. Those who had wanted to be autocratic such as Francis I of France, could not be so simply because they did not have the means to impose their authority over their state. A professional army, housed, fed, clothed and above all regularly paid by the state, had every reason to be loyal. That they were kept away from the civil population meant that when they were called on to enforce royal authority they did so with frightening obedience as the population of Konigsberg experienced under the rule of the Great Elector. The ability of a state’s leader to do this was apparent in 1740 but not in 1460 when royal authority was frequently challenged by over-mighty noblemen, Such a development did change the relationship state leaders had with their people and with their nobility as the latter were frequently brought into royal service which tied them even more to the state’s leader and advanced autocracy within a state. The development of the use of professional soldiers, more accurate weapons with a greater rate of fire, larger armies, an educated officer corns to lead soldiers, the development of areas such as logistics, engineering and communications all totally changed the face of warfare. The potential to use this new type of soldier to enforce a leader’s authority over his people all constitute a revolution in military affairs according to the likes of Roberts and Howard. Their stance is criticised by Jeremy Black. He believes that what took place from 1460 to 1740 was natural progression and as such cannot constitute a “revolution”. He is also critical of the timespan involved - near enough 300 years which he believes is far too long as a period of time to argue that a revolution took place. Black states that the arquebus giving way to the matchlock musket which gave way to the flintlock musket is what would be expected as industrial developments took place and that such developments are only to be expected and as such are not revolutionary. The same argument is put forward with regards to the development of artillery. The unreliable cannon of medieval Europe gave way to the more mobile field artillery such as used by Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years War and this is what would be expected as industrial developments took place and that such developments are only to be expected and as such are not revolutionary. The same argument is put forward with regards to the development of artillery. The unreliable cannon of medieval Europe gave way to the more mobile field artillery such as used by Gustavus in the Thirty Years War, But this would be expected as a by-product of the industrial developments experienced in states such as Sweden. Likewise, the tactics adopted to use these new weapons would also have been expected - why use new weaponry and old redundant tactics? Therefore, argues Black, the calibre of officers had to improve to fully comprehend and exploit the full effectiveness of these weapons. As a result, the introduction of colleges specifically targeted at young officers studying certain precise subjects (logistics etc.) should also have been expected even if the end result did drastically alter warfare. Black does not deny that the end result of the changes over 300 years were not extremely important. However, he believes that their development was to be expected even if their impact on warfare cannot be denied. Black prefers to target the specific era of 1660 to 1740 as a period that saw real and sustained change and which saw the rise to power of states that had previously been second rate in Europe. The so-called “professional era” did usher in a new ‘type’ of soldier and historians do agree on the point that they could sustain a leader’s power and broaden it if needed. The use of troops against the civil population would have been very hard to execute in previous centuries (unless mercenaries could be afforded) simply because most troops were civilians when warfare was not taking place. However, Black has also analysed his chosen period of “revolution” and he has presented arguments as to why this era did not experience a revolution. He states that despite all the improvement in weaponry, tactics, education etc. armies were still incapable of fighting during the winter months and during the times when it rained hard. Mobility, though improved, was still badly hindered by rivers and flooding and this had not changed over the centuries. The fact that armies were at the mercy of certain weather patterns showed that they had come some distance but not enough to constitute a revolution. Black also states that despite the advances, the processes needed to keep an army were far from revolutionised. He highlights the problems faced by the Brandenburg-Prussian army which was considered one of the best in Cl7 Europe but which complained that it was issued with rifles which were of the same type but so poorly made as to have different calibres so that the standard ammunition issued to Prussian soldiers only worked in some rifles and simply fell out of others. He also cites the fact that some commanders in the late C17 and early C18 lost control of the battlefield simply because they could not see as a result of the smoke generated by the weapons on the battlefield during conflict I These problems were experienced and not corrected from 1460 to 1740 and as such the era did not, from Black’s viewpoint, experience a military revolution. Major changes but not a revolution, The evidence provided by historians varies depending on the viewpoint that they wish to support. It also depends on an individual’s definition of “revolution”. Arguments have been put forward by the likes of Howard and Roberts to support their belief that there was a revolution in that the changes in the military between 1460 and 1740 were so marked and had such a political impact that they have to constitute a revolution. This view is not upheld by the likes of Black who believe that they would have taken place naturally and that the changes were far more limited in their effect because of problems that had not been surmounted between 1460 and 1740.
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